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07
Aug 10
The process of learning requires the sophisticated ability to constantly update our expectations of future rewards so we may make accurate predictions about those rewards in the face of a changing environment. Although exactly how the brain orchestrates this process remains unclear, a new study by researchers at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) suggests that a combination of two distinct learning strategies guides our behavior.
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One accepted learning strategy, called model-free learning, relies on trial-and-error comparisons between the reward we expect in a given situation and the reward we actually get. The result of this comparison is the generation of a “reward prediction error,” which corresponds to that difference. For example, a reward prediction error might correspond to the difference between the projected monetary return on a financial investment and our real earnings.
In the second mechanism, called model-based learning, the brain generates a cognitive map of the environment that describes the relationship between different situations. “Model-based learning is associated with the generation of a ’state prediction error,’ which represents the brain’s level of surprise in a new situation given its current estimate of the environment,” says Jan Gläscher, a postdoctoral scholar at Caltech and the lead author of the study.
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Eighteen participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging as they learned the task. The brain scans showed the distinctive, previously characterized neural signature of reward prediction error — generated during model-free learning — in an area in the middle of the brain called the ventral striatum. During model-based learning, however, the neural signature of a state prediction error appeared in two different areas on the surface of the brain in the cerebral cortex: the intraparietal sulcus and the lateral prefrontal cortex.
These observations suggest that two unique types of error signals are computed in the human brain, occur in different brain regions, and may represent separate computational strategies for guiding behavior. “A model-free system operates very effectively in situations that are highly automated and repetitive — for example, if I regularly take the same route home from work,” Gläscher says, “whereas a model-based system, although requiring much greater brain-processing power, is able to adapt flexibly to novel situations, such as needing to find a new route following a roadblock.”
(Link)
For those interested, the actual paper is:
"States versus Rewards: Dissociable Neural Prediction Error Signals Underlying Model-Based and Model-Free Reinforcement Learning", by Jan P. Glascher, Nathaniel Daw, Peter Dayan and John P. O’Doherty.
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18
Jun 10
Razib Khan talks about eye color predicting and not predicting perceived dominance.
First, the study replicates the common finding of some differences in perceived dominance between blue vs. brown-eyed males. But, they observed that when the eye colors were digitally manipulated the dominance ranking did not change. In other words the eye colors seem to have correlated with other traits of masculinity, rather than been a causal signal. The authors offer up a model whereby socialization of blue eyed individuals for longer periods as children (because the trait is neotenous) produces less facial masculinization. But I don’t buy the idea that this couldn’t be genetically mediated by variation on the HERC2/OCA2 locus (where most blue vs. non-blue eye color variation is controlled). In particular, I believe there’s a body of literature that melanin and testosterone production pathways affect each other so that there is a positive correlation, though the exact causal connections are still to be worked out. Note that all this only applies within populations; between population complexion differences don’t necessarily predict dominance differences because the genetic variates are not controlled as they are within populations.
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30
May 10
From an article on daycares and late fees…
The fines that most child-care centres now charge – typically $1 per minute – to discourage adults from being tardy may actually promote lateness, researchers have found.
“Certain cues can switch moral behaviour on or off,” says Samuel Bowles, director of the Behavioural Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico. “Charging for things often switches off moral behaviour.”
Bowles concluded that fines can undermine a parent’s sense of ethical obligation to be on time for the teachers. And lateness becomes “just another commodity” to purchase.
Bowles’s research assigns a moral measure to the incentive principle raised in Freakonomics, which cited a groundbreaking study on daycare fines in Israel. Shortly after six centres in Haifa began charging late parents, the experiment backfired spectacularly. Parents reacted by coming even later.
If you are interested in reading the paper this is based on it is "A Fine is a Price", by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini.
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18
May 10
A nice quote from Razib Khan…
Mutations are as you know a double-edged sword. On the one hand mutations are the stuff of evolution [...] On the other hand mutations also tend to cause problems. In fact, mutations which are deleterious far outnumber those which are positive. It is much easier to break complex systems which are near a fitness optimum than it is to improve upon them through random chance.
[I]n a polygynous population a few healthy males with good genes could give rise to most of the next generation, and so providing the balance of selection to the background mutational rate. [While the rest of the males serve as a "dumping grounds of bad genes".]
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In contrast monogamous populations will have less power to expunge mutations in this fashion because there is more genetic equality across males, the bad will reproduce along with the good, more or less.
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16
May 10
A nice quote from Stephen J. Dubner and Steven D. Levitt…
[Frank Knight] made a distinction between two key factors in decision making: risk and uncertainty. The cardinal difference, Knight declared, is that risk — however great — can be measured, whereas uncertainty cannot.
How do people weigh risk versus uncertainty? Consider a famous experiment that illustrates what is known as the Ellsberg Paradox. There are two urns. The first urn, you are told, contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls. The second one also contains 100 red and black balls, but the number of each color is unknown. If your task is to pick a red ball out of either urn, which urn do you choose?
Most people pick the first urn, which suggests that they prefer a measurable risk to an immeasurable uncertainty. (This condition is known to economists as ambiguity aversion.) Could it be that nuclear energy, risks and all, is now seen as preferable to the uncertainties of global warming?
If you are interested in reading the late Frank Hyneman Knight’s "Risk, Uncertainty & Profit", you can read it here.
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16
May 10
A nice quote from Steve Sailer…
The most striking fact about legalized abortion, but also the least discussed, is its sizable pointlessness. Legalized abortion turned out to be a lot like Homer Simpson’s toast: "To alcohol! The cause of, and solution for, all of life’s problems."
Legal abortion is a major cause of what it was supposed to cure — unwanted pregnancies. [Steven D.] Levitt himself [co-author of "Freakonomics"] notes that following Roe, "Conceptions rose by nearly 30 percent, but births actually fell by 6 percent …" So for every six fetuses aborted in the 1970s, five would never have been conceived except for Roe!
Now, don’t interpret this quoting as an endorsement of the criminalizing of abortion. But it is meant to point out that abortion doesn’t seem to be the “silver bullet” some people make it out to be.
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15
May 10
A nice quote from Andrew Stuttaford…
A characteristic of many priestly castes is the use of esoteric language as a device both to befuddle their audience and to secure their own superior status as interpreters and custodians of the holy writ.